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abstract 
This paper examines the continuing diversity of corporate governance by critically 
analysing the impelling financial forces for convergence, and the vitality of institutional 
differentiation. Competing theories of convergence and diversity are examined through 
the disciplinary perspectives of history and politics, law and regulation, culture, and 
institutional complementarities. The paper challenges whether a universal corporate 
governance system is practical, necessary or desirable. The increasingly recognized 
premium for governance is considered in the context of a globalizing economy. The 
implications of the deregulation of finance and the globalization of capital markets are 
examined, with a focus on the growth of equity markets and the dominant position of the 
Anglo-American stock exchanges. The convergence thesis is debated, examining different 
theoretical arguments for and against the inevitability of convergence of corporate 
governance systems and the resilience of cultural and institutional diversity. This 
institutional diversity serves a productive purpose in contributing innovation and 
differentiation in products and services. The global financial crisis has shaken the 
institutional foundations of all advanced economies, and regulatory and market 
settlements are still occurring. In this context of forces impelling dramatic change yet 
encountering powerful impulses towards institutional continuity, the future direction of 
corporate governance trends is questioned, with the likelihood of greater complexity 
rather than uniformity emerging from current developments. While capital markets have 
acquired an apparently irresistible force in the world economy, it still appears that 
institutional complementarities at the national and regional level represent immovable 
governance objects. The issues are more complex than convergence theorists suggest, 
and while some degree of market convergence might be occurring, simultaneously there 
is the creation of greater divergence within national regimes of corporate governance.  
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Introduction 
This paper examines the continuing diversity of corporate governance by 
critically analysing the impelling financial forces for convergence, and the vitality 
of institutional differentiation. Convergence implies the increasing adoption by 
all governance systems throughout the world of a common set of institutions and 
practices, portrayed as an ideal rational/legal system, but invariably resting upon 
a belief in the virtue of market based relationships, and the associated paradigms 
of the prevailing Anglo-American economic and legal orthodoxy, which insists 
the creation of shareholder value is the ultimate objective of corporate existence. 
By contrast institutional differentiation approaches recognize the ongoing vitality 
of differentiation in the institutions, policies and practices of corporate 
governance, how this reflects differences in culture, values and conceptions of 
corporate purpose, and why this contributes to quality and variety in regional 
industries and products. 
Competing theories of convergence and diversity are examined through the 
disciplinary perspectives of history and politics, law and regulation, culture, and 
institutional complementarities. A central thesis of the analysis is the increasing 
intensification of the financialisation of the global economy, which translates for 
corporations into an enveloping regime of maximizing shareholder value as the 
primary objective. These financial pressures may have originated in the Anglo-
American world, and are manifest in the vast international scale and penetration 
of Anglo-American financial institutions, however similar developments are 
becoming insistent in Europe, the Asia Pacific, and throughout the emerging 
economies. Yet diversified governance institutions confronted by these 
continuous pressures for international convergence have proved resilient and 
viable. The conclusion of the analysis is that this differentiation is valuable since 
different governance systems are better at doing different things, as revealed in 
the relative strengths and weaknesses in governance, investment strategy, and 
product specialization. In practice simultaneously there may be a dual dynamic 
of convergence and divergence taking place, where corporations learn to live with 
some of the pressures of international financial markets, yet value the 
differentiation of their regional cultures and institutions, while they strive to 
maintain and enhance the distinctiveness of their corporate objectives. 
Indeed a fatal flaw of the convergence thesis is the assumption that some 
uniform, homogenized, corporate governance system would in all circumstances 
prove superior both functionally and institutionally than the present diversified 
system. In fact as a result of the differences in corporate governance structure 
and objectives, the different governance systems demonstrate unique strengths 
and weaknesses: they are good at doing different things, and they all have 
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different problems to deal with (Clarke and Bostock, 1994; Moerland, 1995; 
Coombes and Watson, 2000; Dore, 2000; Clarke, 2011; Clarke and Branson, 
2012; Clarke, 2016a). Anglo-American governance systems support a dynamic 
market orientation with fluid capital which can quickly chase market 
opportunities wherever they occur. This agility, ready availability of capital, 
intelligence and speed has enabled the US to capitalize on fast moving industries 
including media, software, professional services and finance in an industrial 
resurgence that temporarily reasserted US economic ascendancy. The weakness 
of this system is the corollary of its strength: the inherent volatility, short-
termism and inadequate governance procedures that have often led to corporate 
disasters and have caused periodic financial crises (Clarke, 2013). Adopting a 
different orientation European enterprise as typified by the German governance 
system has committed to long term industrial strategies supported by stable 
capital investment and robust governance procedures that build enduring 
relationships with key stakeholders (Cernat, 2004; Lane, 2003). This was the 
foundation of the German economic miracle that carried the country forward as 
one of the leading exporters in the world of goods renowned for their exceptional 
quality and reliability including luxury automobiles and precision instruments. 
Again the weaknesses of this system are the corollary of its strengths: the depth 
of relationships leading to a lack of flexibility in pursuing new business 
opportunities in new industries and internationally. It should be noted that the 
German system of governance is typical of the coordinated market economies 
(Japan, Sweden, and Germany) of Northern Europe that have concentrated 
ownership and overall cooperative relations with employees compared to the 
mixed market Latin economies (France, Italy and Spain) which also have 
concentrated ownership but more conflictual relations between employers and 
employees (Goyer and Jung, 2011; Hancké et al., 2007; Hancké, 2009). In Asia 
corporate governance systems are the most networked of all, with the firm at the 
centre of long and enduring economic relationships with investors, employees, 
suppliers and customers (Claessens and Fan, 2002). This insider approach has 
yielded the longest investment horizons of all, and was for example the key to 
Japanese success in dominating overseas markets in the US and Europe with 
advanced electronic consumer goods, as well as in affordable quality 
automobiles. More recently the capacity for investing in the long term has seen 
the entrance onto the world stage of impressive Chinese corporations such as the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China as the world’s largest bank by assets, 
and Huawei as one of the world’s leading telecommunications manufacturers. 
However just as the weak and secretive corporate governance practices of Japan 
ultimately led to the bursting of the Japanese bubble in the early 1990s, and to 
successive governance problems since, so too the apparently inexorable rise of 
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Chinese enterprise is threatened by covert governance and lack of transparency 
and accountability in finance. 
A more realistic perspective than the convergence thesis is a more nuanced 
understanding that despite the financial and other market pressures towards 
convergence there will continue to be considerable diversity in the forms of 
corporate governance developing around the world. Different traditions, values 
and objectives will undoubtedly continue to produce different outcomes in 
governance, which will relate closely to the choices and preferences people 
exercise in engaging in business activity. If there is convergence of corporate 
governance, it could be to a variety of different forms, and it is likely there will be 
divergence away from the shareholder oriented Anglo-American model, as there 
will be convergence towards it. There is a growing realisation that shareholder 
value is a debilitating ideology which is undermining corporations with an over-
simplification of complex business reality, weakening managers, corporations 
and economies, and ignoring the diversity of investment institutions and 
interests (Clarke, 2014; Clarke, 2015; Lazonick, 2014). Moreover the convergence 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach studiously denies the essential entrepreneurship and 
creativity involved in business endeavour that will continuously give rise to 
innovative and dynamic forms of corporate governance as we are presently 
seeing in new forms of social enterprise, B-corporations, and other business 
ventures which in turn create and develop new complementary institutions. 
A universal corporate governance system? 
In the contest between three resolutely different approaches to corporate 
governance in the Anglo-American, European and Asia-Pacific models, the 
question arises: is one system more robust than the others and will this system 
prevail and become universal? The answer to this question appeared 
straightforward in the 1990s. The US economy was ascendant, and the American 
market-based approach appeared the most dynamic and successful. Functional 
convergence towards the market-based system seemed to be occurring inexorably 
driven by forces such as: 
• Increasingly massive international financial flows which offered deep, 
liquid capital markets to countries and companies that could meet certain 
minimum international corporate governance standards. 
• Growing influence of the great regional stock exchanges, including the 
NYSE and NASDAQ, London Stock Exchange, and Euronext – where the 
largest corporations in the world were listed regardless of their home 
country. 
Thomas Clarke The continuing diversity of corporate governance 
article  | 23 
• Developing activity of ever-expanding Anglo-American based gargantuan 
institutional investors, advancing policies to balance their portfolios with 
increasing international investments if risk could be mitigated. 
• Expanding revenues and market capitalization of multinational 
enterprises (often Anglo-American corporations, invariably listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange even if European-based), combined with a 
sustained wave of international mergers and acquisitions from which 
increasingly global companies were emerging. 
• Accelerating convergence towards international accounting standards; 
and a worldwide governance movement towards more independent 
auditing standards, and rigorous corporate governance practices. 
Together these forces have provoked one of the liveliest debates of the last two 
decades concerning the globalization and convergence of corporate governance 
(Roe, 2000; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Branson, 2001; McDonnell, 2002; 
McCahery et al., 2002; Roe, 2003; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Gunter and van 
der Hoeven, 2004; Lomborg, 2004; Jesovar and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Hamilton and 
Quinlan, 2005; Jacoby, 2007; Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Williams and 
Zumbansen, 2011; Aguilera et al., 2012; Jackson and Deeg, 2012; Jackson and 
Sorge, 2012; Clarke, 2014; Clarke 2016a). As functional convergence proceeds in 
the way corporate access to finance and governance practices become universal, it 
is assumed that institutional convergence of legal and regulatory bodies, and 
governance institutions will become identical. How high the stakes are in this 
debate is revealed by Gordon and Roe: 
Globalization affects the corporate governance reform agenda in two ways. First, it 
heightens anxiety over whether particular corporate governance systems confer 
competitive economic advantage. As trade barriers erode, the locally protected 
product marketplace disappears. A country’s firms’ performance is more easily 
measured against global standards. Poor performance shows up more quickly 
when a competitor takes away market share, or innovates quickly. National 
decision makers must consider whether to protect locally favored corporate 
governance regimes if they regard the local regime as weakening local firms in 
product markets or capital markets. Concern about comparative economic 
performance induces concern about corporate governance. Globalization’s second 
effect comes from capital markets’ pressure on corporate governance. […] Despite 
a continuing bias in favor of home-country investing, the internationalization of 
capital markets has led to more cross-border investing. New stockholders enter, 
and they aren’t always part of any local corporate governance consensus. They 
prefer a corporate governance regime they understand and often believe that 
reform will increase the value of their stock. Similarly, even local investors may 
make demands that upset a prior local consensus. The internationalization of 
capital markets means that investment flows may move against firms perceived to 
have suboptimal governance and thus to the disadvantage of the countries in 
which those firms are based. (2004: 2) 
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In the inevitable contest between the insider, relationship-based, stakeholder-
oriented corporate governance system and the outsider, market- based, 
shareholder value-oriented system, it is often implied that the optimal model is 
the dispersed ownership with shareholder foci for achieving competitiveness and 
enhancing any economy in a globalised world. The OECD, World Bank, IMF, 
Asian Development Bank and other international agencies, while they have 
recognized the existence of different governance systems and suggested they 
would not wish to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, have nonetheless 
consistently associated the rules-based outsider mode of corporate governance 
with greater efficiency and capacity to attract investment capital, and relegated 
the relationship-based insider mode to second best, often with the implication 
that these systems may be irreparably flawed. The drive towards functional 
convergence was supported by the development of increasing numbers of 
international codes and standards of corporate governance. 
The vast weight of scholarship, led by the financial economists, has reinforced 
these ideas to the point where they appeared unassailable at the height of the new 
economy boom in the US in the 1990s (which coincided with a long recession 
for both the leading exponents of the relationship-based system, Japan and 
Germany), supporting the view that an inevitable convergence towards the 
superior Anglo-American model of corporate governance was occurring. This all 
appeared an integral part of the irresistible rise of globalisation and 
financialisation that was advancing through the regions of the world in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, with apparently unstoppable force. Economies, cultures 
and peoples increasingly were becoming integrated into global markets, media 
networks, and foreign ideologies in a way never before experienced. It seemed as 
if distinctive and valued regional patterns of corporative governance would be 
absorbed just as completely as other cultural institutions in the integrative and 
homogenising processes of globalisation. The increasing power of global capital 
markets, stock exchanges, institutional investors, and international regulation 
would overwhelm cultural and institutional differences in the approach to 
corporate governance. 
Yet just as there are many countries that continue to value greatly the distinctions 
of their culture and institutions they would not wish to lose to any globalised 
world, people also believe there are unique attributes to the different corporate 
governance systems they have developed over time, and are not convinced these 
should be sacrificed to some unquestioning acceptance that a universal system 
will inevitably be better. The field of comparative corporate governance has 
continued to develop however, and a different and more complex picture of 
governance systems is now emerging. The objectives of corporate governance are 
more closely questioned; the qualities of the variety and relationships of different 
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institutional structures are becoming more apparent; the capability and 
performance of the different systems more closely examined; and different 
potential outcomes of any convergence of governance systems realized. While 
capital markets have acquired an apparently irresistible force in the world 
economy, it still appears that institutional complementarities at the national and 
regional level represent immovable objects (Jacoby, 2007; Deeg and Jackson, 
2007; Williams and Zumbansen, 2011; Jackson and Deeg, 2012; Clarke, 2014; 
Clarke 2016a). This is not to argue the immutability of institutions which of 
course are continuously engaged in complex processes of creation, development 
and reinvention in the economic, social and cultural context in which they exist. 
However, what is at issue is the causation and direction of these institutional 
changes. From the convergence perspective they are a logical result of adopting 
the superior Anglo-American institutions of corporate governance and financial 
markets. From the perspective of those who respect and understand the reasons 
for institutional diversity and value the outcomes of this diversity, institutional 
change is a more autonomous process embedded within economies and 
societies, which may indeed have to negotiate some settlement with international 
market forces, but strive to do so while maintaining their own values.  
An apparent third possibility to the two polar positions of 
convergence/institutional diversity is recognised by Coffee (2000; 2001) and 
Gilson (2000). Coffee (2000: 5) distinguishes ‘functional convergence’ 
(similarities in activities and objectives) from ‘formal convergence’ (common 
legal rules and institutions) and contends that functional substitutes may provide 
alternative means to the same ends (for example, a European company with weak 
investor protection and securities markets could list on the London or New York 
exchanges with rules that require greater disclosure of information, providing a 
framework of protections for minority shareholders not available in common law 
countries). Coffee argues that while the law matters, legal reforms follow rather 
than lead market changes. Gilson (2000: 10) offers a more robust view of the 
force of functional convergence: 
Path dependency, however, is not the only force influencing the shape of corporate 
governance institutions. Existing institutions are subject to powerful 
environmental selection mechanisms. If existing institutions cannot compete with 
differently organized competitors, ultimately they will not survive. Path dependent 
formal characteristics of national governance institutions confront the discipline of 
the operative selection mechanisms that encourage functional convergence to the 
more efficient structure and, failing that, formal convergence as well. 
This view from Columbia University Law School of the ascendancy of functional 
governance in Europe and elsewhere, might have carried more weight if Coffee 
had not concluded his 2000 paper with a celebration of Germany’s rapidly 
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growing Neuer Markt as the ‘clearest example’ of self-regulatory alternative 
functional governance creating a greater constituency for open and transparent 
markets. In fact, Germany’s Neuer Markt launched as Europe’s answer to the 
Nasdaq in 1997, collapsed with a precipitous decline in market value and 
numerous bankruptcies in 2003, leaving the question of how innovative German 
firms could enter the public equity markets unresolved (Burghof and Hunger, 
2003). As von Kalckreuth and Silbermann (2010) state, this represented ‘[t]he 
spectacular rise and fall of the first and most important European market for hi-
tech stocks. Given investors’ frenzy, the Neuer Markt was a special kind of 
natural experiment’. For some time, financing constraints were virtually non-
existent, but as occurred, ‘faulty valuation by stock markets may directly induce 
destructive corporate behaviour: slack, empire building, excessive risk-taking, 
and fraud’ (ibid.). While more viable illustrations of functional convergence could 
readily be found, it could be argued that this approach is largely another route to 
the convergence thesis rather than an alternative. Indeed, functional 
convergence, since it is easier to achieve than institutional convergence, could 
prove a quicker route to shareholder value orientations. 
Globalisation of capital markets 
The convergence thesis is derived essentially from the globalisation thesis: that 
irresistible market forces are impelling the integration of economies and 
societies. Globalisation represents a profound reconfiguration of the world 
economy compared to earlier periods of internationalization. ‘An international 
economy links distinct national markets: a global economy fuses national markets 
into a coherent whole.’ (Kubrin, 2002: 7; Clarke and dela Rama, 2006). A major 
driver of the globalisation phenomenon has proved the massive development of 
finance markets, and their increasing influence upon every other aspect of the 
economy:  
Financial globalisation, i.e. the integration of more and more countries into the 
international financial system and the expansion of international markets for 
money, capital and foreign exchange, took off in the 1970s. From the 1980s on, 
the increase in cross-border holdings of assets outpaced the increase in 
international trade, and financial integration accelerated once more in the 1990s… 
The past decade has also seen widespread improvements in macroeconomic and 
structural policies that may to some extent be linked to a disciplining effect of 
financial integration. Moreover, there is evidence that financial linkages have 
strengthened the transmission of cyclical impulses and shocks among industrial 
countries. Financial globalisation is also likely to have helped the build-up of 
significant global current account imbalances. Finally, a great deal of the public 
and academic discussion has focussed on the series of financial crises in the 
1990s, which has highlighted the potential effects of capital account liberalisation 
on the volatility of growth and consumption. (European Commission, 2005: 19) 
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The complex explanation for this massive financialisation of the world economy is 
pieced together by Ronald Dore thus: 
• Financial services take up an ever larger share of advertising, economic 
activity and highly skilled manpower. 
• Banks respond to the decline in loan business with a shift to earning fees 
for financial and investment services and own account trading. 
• Shareholder value is preached as the sole legitimate objective and 
aspiration of corporations and executives. 
• Insistent and demanding calls for ‘level playing fields’ from the World 
Trade Organisation and Bank of International Settlements (BIS), with 
pressures for the further liberalisation of financial markets, and greater 
international competition forcing international financial institutions, and 
other corporations to work within the same parameters. (Dore, 2000: 4-
6) 
What is resulting from this insistent impulse of the increasingly dominant 
financial institutions are economies (and corporations) increasingly dependent 
upon financial markets:  
Global integration and economic performance has been fostered by a new 
dynamic in financial markets, which both mirrors and amplifies the effects of 
foreign direct investment and trade driven integration. The economic performance 
of countries across the world is increasingly supported by – and dependent on – 
international capital flows, which have built on a process of progressive 
liberalisation and advances in technology since the 1980s’ (European 
Commission, 2005: 8). 
Financial innovations and financial cycles have periodically impacted 
substantially on economies and societies, most notably in the recent global 
financial crisis (Rajan, 2010; Clarke, 2010a). However the new global era of 
financialisation is qualitatively different from earlier regimes. Global finance is 
now typified by a more international, integrated and intensive mode of 
accumulation, a new business imperative of the maximization of shareholder 
value, and a remarkable capacity to become an intermediary in every aspect of 
daily life (van der Zwan, 2013). Hence finance as a phenomenon today is more 
universal, aggressive and pervasive than ever before (Krippner, 2005; 2012; 
Epstein, 2005; 2015; Dore, 2008; Davis, 2009; van der Zwan, 2013). These 
financial pressures are translated into the operations of corporations through the 
enveloping regime of maximizing shareholder value as the primary objective. 
Agency theory has provided the rationale for this project, prioritizing 
shareholders above all other participants in the corporation, and focusing 
corporate managers on the release of shareholder value incentivized by their own 
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stock options. In turn this leads to an obsessive emphasis on financial 
performance measures, with increasingly short term business horizons 
(Lazonick, 2012; 2014; Clarke, 2013; Clarke, 2015). 
The growth of international equity markets 
A vital dimension of the increasing financialisation of the world economy is the 
growth of capital markets, and especially the vast growth of equity markets, 
where volatility has been experienced at its furthest extremities. What this 
demonstrates is the overwhelming predominance of Anglo-American 
institutions and activity in world equity markets, and how to a great extent these 
markets reflect largely Anglo-American interests, as the rest of the world 
depends more on other sources of corporate finance. This pre-eminence of equity 
markets is a very recent phenomenon. Historically, the primary way most 
businesses throughout the world (including in the Anglo-American region) have 
financed the growth of their companies is internally through retained earnings. 
In most parts of the world until recently, this was a far more dependable source 
of capital rather then relying on equity markets. Equity finance has proved useful 
at the time of public listing when entrepreneurs and venture capitalists cash in 
their original investment, as a means of acquiring other companies, or providing 
rewards for executives through stock options. Equity finance is used much less 
frequently during restructuring or to finance new product or project development 
(Lazonick, 1992: 457). In Europe and the Asia-Pacific however, this capital was in 
the past provided by majority shareholders, banks, or other related companies (to 
the extent it was needed by companies committed to organic growth rather than 
through acquisition, and where executives traditionally were content with more 
modest personal material rewards than their American counterparts). 
The euphoria of the US equity markets did reach across the Atlantic with a flurry 
of new listings, which formed part of a sustained growth in the market 
capitalisation of European stock exchanges as a percentage of GDP. A keen 
attraction of equity markets for ambitious companies is the possibility of using 
shares in equity swaps as a means of taking over other companies thus fuelling 
the take-over markets of Europe. This substantial development of the equity 
markets of France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and Belgium and other 
countries began to influence the corporate landscape of Europe, and was further 
propelled by the formation of Euronext, and the subsequent merger with the 
NYSE. Indeed, as the regulatory implications of Sarbanes Oxley emerged in the 
United States from 2003 onwards, the market for IPOs moved emphatically 
towards London, Hong Kong and other exchanges. Concerned about the impact 
of Sarbanes Oxley on the US economy a group of authorities formed the 
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Committee on Capital Markets Regulation highlighted the damage being caused 
to what for many years was recognised as ‘the largest, most liquid, and most 
competitive public equity capital markets in the world’ (CCMR, 2006: ix). 
Though the US total share of global stock market activity remained at 50 per cent 
in 2005, and the IPO activity had collapsed. From attracting 48 per cent of global 
IPOs in the late 1990s, the US share dropped to 6 per cent in 2005, when 24 of 
the 25 largest IPOs were in other countries (CCMR, 2006: 2). The more relaxed 
regulatory environment of the UK and other jurisdictions clearly for a time at 
least proved attractive in an ongoing process of international regulatory arbitrage. 
This greater vibrancy in European markets partly explains the NYSE’s interest in 
merging with Euronext, and the NASDAQ’s long but failed courtship with the 
London Stock Exchange. Any such mergers represent a further US bridgehead 
into the equity markets of Europe, rather than the converse. Along with the 
growth in market capitalisation in European exchanges occurred a gradual 
increase also in trading value. It appears that contemporary equity markets 
inevitably will be associated with high levels of trading activity, as a growing 
proportion of trading is algorithmic high frequency computer generated. 
Following the global financial crisis, regulatory intervention in finance was 
perceived to be more robust in Europe and the UK, and less so in the United 
States (with the slow pace of the introduction of the monumental Dodd-Frank 
Act). In this context the attractions of the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq 
returned, and by 2014 reached once again the levels of IPO financing in the dot-
com 1990s era, far exceeding the amounts raised in the London and Hong Kong 
markets combined (Financial Times, 29 September 2014). 
The important role of equity markets in fostering further international financial 
integration was recognised by the European Commission (2005): ‘Globally, 
portfolio investment is the largest asset category held cross-border; global 
portfolios (equity and debt securities) amounted to 19 trillion US dollar at the end 
of 2003 (IMF CPIS, preliminary data)’. As equity markets come to play a more 
powerful role in corporate life in Europe, Japan and other parts of the world, a set 
of assumptions and practices are also disseminated which may confront long 
standing values and ideals in the economies and societies concerned. 
Specifically, the ascendancy of shareholder value as the single legitimate 
objective of corporations and their executives, usually accompanies increasing 
dependence upon equity markets. Dore cites a Goldman Sachs study of 
manufacturing value added in the United States, Germany and Europe in 
general, which concluded that:  
The share of gross value added going to wages and salaries has declined on trend 
in the US since the early 1980s. In fact, for the US, this appears to be an extension 
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of a trend that has been in place since the early 1970s… We believe that the 
pressures of competition for the returns on capital available in the emerging 
economies have forced US industry to produce higher returns on equity capital 
and that their response to this has been to reserve an increasingly large share of 
output for the owners of capital. (Young, 1997) 
This insistent pressure to drive increases in capital’s returns at the expense of 
labour inherent in Anglo-American conceptions of the nature of equity finance is 
roundly condemned by Dore as the negation of essential values previously 
considered central to economic good in both Europe and Japan: 
 Multiple voices are urging Japanese managers to go in the same direction. The 
transformation on the agenda may be variously described – from employee 
sovereignty to shareholder sovereignty: from the employee-favouring firm to the 
shareholder-favouring firm; from pseudo-capitalism to genuine capitalism. They 
all mean the same thing: the transformation of firms run primarily for the benefits 
of their employees into firms run primarily, even exclusively, for the benefit of 
their shareholders… It means an economy centred on the stock market as the 
measure of corporate success and on the stock market index as a measure of 
national well-being, as opposed to an economy which has other, better, more 
pluralistic criteria of human welfare for measuring progress towards the good 
society. (2000: 9-10) 
The euphoric enthusiasm for the power of equity markets was severely dented by 
the Enron/WorldCom series of corporate collapses in the US. With about seven 
trillion dollars wiped off the New York stock exchange in 2001/2002, and the 
executives of many leading corporations facing criminal prosecution, the 
recovery in equity markets came sooner and more robustly than expected. 
However part of the price of restoring confidence to the markets was the hasty 
passage of the Sarbanes Oxley legislation and increased regulation of corporate 
governance.  
Yet Sarbanes Oxley apparently did little to curb the animal spirits of some fringes 
of the US financial institutions that ultimately impacted on the world economy. 
The subprime mortgage crisis, and the elaborate financial instruments developed 
to pass on risk by investment banks, that caused a prolonged implosion of 
financial institutions in the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 was an 
indication of the dangers presented by the increasing financialisation of 
economic activity, and the hazardous context for corporate governance in market 
oriented economies (Clarke, 2010a). Nonetheless despite the strenuous 
intervention of the G20, Financial Stability Board internationally and the Dodd-
Frank legislation in the US intended to restrain the most dangerous impulses of 
financial institutions, the strength and vigour of capital markets seems destined 
to continue to advance globally without adequate regulation or oversight (Clarke 
and Klettner, 2011; Avgouleas, 2013).  
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While each of the regional systems of finance and corporate governance remains 
in the post-financial crisis period weakened and to a degree disoriented, the 
substance and rhythm of institutional varieties continues: in Germany there 
remains an incomplete form of market liberalization, and resilient elements of 
the social market economy (Jackson and Sorge, 2012); in France, while the neo-
liberal reforms have undermined social alliances and the pressures for 
institutional change increase, social commitments continue (Amable et al., 
2012); and in Japan the incursions of hedge funds and private equity with a 
growing proportion of overseas ownership of Japanese corporations has not 
deflected Japanese executives from maintaining more inclusive conceptions in 
their definition of corporate purpose (Seki and Clarke, 2014). 
Convergence and diversity of corporate governance 
Despite the recurrent crises originating in Anglo-American finance and 
governance in this period, and in the background the continuing reverberations 
of the global financial crisis, the confidence the market based system was the 
only way forward has continued almost undaunted in government and business 
circles, certainly in the Anglo-American world (Clarke, 2010a). Underlying the 
resurging energy of advancing equity markets and the proliferating corporate 
governance guidelines and policy documents appearing in such profusion over 
the last two decades is an implicit but confident sense that an optimal corporate 
governance model is indeed emerging:  
An optimal model with dispersed ownership and shareholder foci… The OECD 
and World Bank promote corporate governance reform… Influenced by financial 
economists and are generally promoting market capitalism with a law matters 
approach, although for political reasons, they do not advocate too strongly market 
capitalism and allow for other corporate governance systems (i.e. concentrated 
ownership). (Pinto, 2005: 26-7)  
Other authorities are less diplomatic in announcing the superiority of the Anglo-
American approach that other systems must inevitably converge towards. Two 
US eminent law school professors Hansmann and Kraakman in an article 
prophetically entitled The end of history for corporate law led the charge of the 
convergence determinists: 
Despite very real differences in the corporate systems, the deeper tendency is 
towards convergence, as it has been since the nineteenth century. The core legal 
features of the corporate form were already well established in advanced 
jurisdictions one hundred years ago, at the turn of the twentieth century. Although 
there remained considerable room for variation in governance practices and in the 
fine structure of corporate law throughout the twentieth century, the pressures for 
further convergence are now rapidly growing. Chief among these pressures is the 
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recent dominance of a shareholder-centred ideology of corporate law among the 
business, government and legal entities in key commercial jurisdictions. There is 
no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally 
strive to increase long-term shareholder value. This emergent consensus has 
already profoundly affected corporate governance practices throughout the world. 
It is only a matter of time before its influence is felt in the reform of corporate law 
as well. (2001: 1) 
The irony of this profoundly ideological claim (the most recent in a long 
historical lineage of similar appeals), is that it attempts to enforce the consensus 
it claims exists, by crowding out any possibility of alternatives. This is not an 
isolated example, but the dominant approach of much legal and financial 
discussion in the United States, where as McDonnell insists the prevailing view 
is:  
The American system works better and that the other countries are in the process 
of converging to the American system. Though there is some dissent from this 
position, the main debate has been over why countries outside the United States 
have persisted for so long in their benighted systems and what form their 
convergence to the American way will take. The scholarly discussion has 
converged too quickly on the convergence answer. (2002: 2)  
It is worth asking by what standards or criteria a system of corporate governance 
may be defined as ‘optimal’? Where a definition is offered in the convergence 
literature for an optimal corporate governance system it invariably relates to 
accountability to shareholders, and often to maximising shareholder value which 
became an increasingly insistent ideology in Anglo-American analyses of 
corporate purpose. The narrow financial metrics relating to maximising 
shareholder value often are presented as the only valid measures of an optimal 
corporate governance system, when there are deeper and wider measures that 
could be employed in the estimation of business performance. 
Business success might be measured in longevity, scale, revenue, sales, 
employment, product quality, customer satisfaction, or many other measures 
that might be found relevant in different societies at different times. Certainly 
the measures of business success employed in Europe and Asia are quite 
different from the Anglo-Saxon world, and would embrace wider stakeholder 
interests. Most economic analyses simply substitute ‘efficient’ for optimal, but 
McDonnell (2002) offers three relevant values: 
a) efficiency 
b) equity  
c) participation 
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In considering efficiency there is the question of how well the governance system 
solves agency problems; how well the system facilitates large scale coordination 
problems; how well the systems encourage long-term innovation; and how they 
impose different levels of risk on the participants. Distributional equity is 
another important value, but again is difficult to measure. For many 
distributional equity suggests increased prosperity should provide for an 
increased equality of income and wealth, but others find this less compelling. In 
some instances, equity may conflict with efficiency: it could be argued the US 
system is more efficient, but inevitably results in greater inequality. Alternatively 
equity may be associated with more collaborative creativity. Finally there is the 
value of participation, both in terms of any contribution this may make to the 
success of the enterprise, and as an end in itself in enhancing the ability and self-
esteem of people. Corporate governance systems affect the level of participation 
in decision-making very directly, whether encouraging or disallowing active 
participation in enterprise decision-making (McDonnell, 2002: 4).  
Arguably each of these values is of great importance, and the precise balance 
between them is part of the choice of what kind of corporate governance system 
is adopted. Yet there appears increasingly less opportunity to exercise this choice: 
The universe of theoretical possibilities is much richer than a dominant strand of 
the literature suggests, and we are currently far short of the sort of empirical 
evidence that might help us sort out these possibilities. Most commentators have 
focused on efficiency to the exclusion of other values. Moreover, even if 
convergence occurs, there is a possibility that we will not converge on the best 
system. Even if we converge to the current best system, convergence still may not 
be desirable. (McDonnell, 2002: 2) 
History and politics 
In the past these critical political choices on which system of governance provides 
the most value in terms of efficiency, equity and participation have been made 
and defended. Mark Roe’s (2000; 2003) path dependence thesis rests on how 
political forces in America, anxious about the influence of concentrated financial 
or industrial monopolies, resisted any effort at concentration of ownership or 
ownership through financial institutions, resulting in dispersed ownership. In 
contrast European social democracy has tended to favour other stakeholder 
interests, particularly labour, as a system that promotes welfare among all 
citizens and attempts to prevent wide disparities. In turn this can be viewed as a 
reaction to the historical rise of fascism and communism (Pinto, 2005: 22). 
Fligstein and Freeland (1995: 21) adopt a similar historical view that the form of 
governance is a result of wider political and institutional developments: 
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i. the timing of entry into industrialisation and the institutionalisation of 
that process; 
ii. the role of states in regulating property rights and the rules of 
competition between firms; and 
iii. the social organisation of national elite. 
In this way characteristic institutions of the US economy can be traced back to 
distinctive political and regulatory intervention, resulting for example in 
historically distributed banks, diversified companies, and the dominance of the 
diversified (M-form) corporations. In contrast in Europe and Japan the regulatory 
environment encouraged a very different approach:  
Regulatory policy in the United States had the unintended consequence of 
pushing U.S. companies in the direction of unrelated diversification, whereas in 
Germany and Japan it continued on a pre-war trajectory of discouraging mergers 
in favour of cartels and of promoting corporate growth through internal expansion 
rather than acquisitions. In other words, modern regulatory policy in the U.S. 
produced corporations who relied on markets to acquire ideas and talent, whereas 
in Germany and Japan it produced corporations whose primary emphasis was on 
production and on the internal generation of ideas through development of 
human capital and organizational learning. The implications for corporate 
governance are straightforward: corporations favour shareholders in the U.S. so as 
to obtain capital for diversification and acquisitions; they favour managers and 
employees in the Germany and Japan so as to create internal organizational 
competencies. (Jacoby, 2001: 8) 
A very different reading of these events is offered by Rajan and Zingales (2003), 
who argue that widely dispersed shareholders is related to the development of 
liquid securities markets and the openness to outside investments, while it was 
not social democracy but protectionism that kept European and Japanese 
markets closed from competition with concentrated ownership. As financial 
economists they favour the globalisation route to open market based competition, 
which they see as the way to unsettling local elites, achieving dispersed 
ownership, raising capital, and improving corporate governance.  
Law and regulation 
Following a different line of analysis the substantial empirical evidence of La 
Porta et al. (1998; 1999; 2000; 2002) concerning countries with dispersed and 
concentrated ownership, which demonstrates differences in the legal protection 
of shareholders was very influential. Law and regulation may impede or promote 
convergence or divergence. In many countries without adequate laws 
guaranteeing dispersed shareholder rights, the only alternative appeared to 
maintain control through concentrated ownership. This led to the conclusion 
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that the law determined the ownership structure and system of corporate finance 
and governance. Jurisdictions where the law was more protective encouraged the 
emergence of more dispersed ownership (Pinto, 2005: 19). Coffee (2001) extends 
La Porta et al.’s acceptance that in the common law system there was greater 
flexibility of response to new developments offering better protection to 
shareholders, to the argument that the critical role of the decentralised character 
of common law institutions was to facilitate the rise of both private and semi-
private self-regulatory bodies in the US and UK. In contrast in civil law systems 
the state maintained a restrictive monopoly over law-making institutions (for 
example in the early intrusion of the French government into the affairs of the 
Paris Bourse involving the Ministry of Finance approving all new listings). Coffee 
concludes that it was market institutions that demanded legal protection rather 
than the other way around: 
The cause and effect sequence posited by the La Porta et al. thesis may in effect 
read history backwards. They argue that strong markets require strong mandatory 
rules as a precondition. Although there is little evidence that strong legal rules 
encouraged the development of either the New York or London Stock Exchanges 
(and there is at least some evidence that strong legal rules hindered the growth of 
the Paris Bourse), the reverse does seem to be true: strong markets do create a 
demand for stronger legal rules. Both in the U.S. and the U.K., as liquid securities 
markets developed and dispersed ownership became prevalent, a new political 
constituency developed that desired legal rules capable of filling in the inevitable 
enforcement gaps that self-regulation left. Both the federal securities laws passed 
in the 1930’s in the U.S. and the Company Act amendments adopted in the late 
1940's in the U.K. were a response to this demand (and both were passed by 
essentially “social democratic” administrations seeking to protect public securities 
markets). Eventually, as markets have matured across Europe, similar forces have 
led to the similar creation of European parallels to the SEC. In each case, law 
appears to be responding to changes in the market, not consciously leading it. 
(Coffee, 2001: 6) 
Culture – Deep causation 
In the search for explanations some have attempted a philosophical approach 
including Fukuyama (1996) who conceives of business organisations as the 
product of trust, and the different governance systems as built of different forms 
of trust relations. Regarding the social foundations and development of 
ownership structures and the law, other writers have examined the correlations 
between law and culture. Licht (2001) examines the relevance of national culture 
to corporate governance and securities regulation, and explores the relationship 
between different cultural types and the law: 
 A nation’s culture can be perceived as the mother of all path dependencies. 
Figuratively, it means that a nation’s culture might be more persistent than other 
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factors believed to induce path dependence. Substantively, a nation’s unique set of 
cultural values might indeed affect – in a chain of causality – the development of 
that nation’s laws in general and its corporate governance system in particular. 
(2001: 149)  
In working towards a cross-cultural theory of corporate governance systems, 
Licht (2001) demonstrates that corporate governance laws exhibit systematic 
cultural characteristics.  
A comparison between a taxonomy of corporate governance regimes according to 
legal families (‘the legal approach’) and a classification of countries according to 
their shared cultural values demonstrates that the legal approach provides only a 
partial, if not misleading, depiction of the universe of corporate governance 
regimes. Dividing shareholder protection regimes according to groups of culturally 
similar nations is informative. The evidence corroborates the uniqueness of 
common law origin regimes in better protecting minority shareholders. However, 
statutes in the English Speaking cultural region offer levels of protection to 
creditors similar to the laws in the Western European or Latin American regions. 
Our findings cast doubt on the alleged supremacy of common law regimes in 
protecting creditors and, therefore, investors in general. Finally, we find that 
analyses of corporate governance laws in Far Eastern countries, a distinct cultural 
region, would benefit from combining an approach that draws on cultural value 
dimensions and one that draws on legal families. (Licht, 2001: 32) 
Licht concludes that corporations are embedded within larger socio-cultural 
settings in which they are incorporated and operate. Cultural values are 
influential in determining the types of legal regimes perceived and accepted as 
legitimate in any country, and serve as a guide to legislators. Hence cultural 
values may impede legal reforms that conflict with them and the naiveté 
underlying quick-fix suggestions for corporate law reform (2001: 33-4). Culture 
also influences what are perceived as the maximands of corporate governance – 
for example in the debate over stockholders’ versus stakeholders’ interests as the 
ultimate objective of the corporation: ‘The corporate governance problem 
therefore is not one of maximising over a single factor (the maximand). Rather, it 
calls for optimizing over several factors simultaneously’ (Licht, 2003: 5). Berglof 
and von Thadden (1999) suggest the economic approach to corporate governance 
should be generalised to a model of multilateral interactions among a number of 
different stakeholders. They argue that though protection of shareholder interests 
may be important, it may not be sufficient for sustainable development, 
particularly in transitional economies. Licht concludes:  
Every theory of corporate governance is at heart a theory of power. In this view, the 
corporation is a nexus of power relationships more than a nexus of contracts. The 
corporate setting is rife with agency relationships in which certain parties have the 
ability (power) unilaterally to affect the interests of other parties notwithstanding 
pre-existing contractual arrangements. In the present context, corporate fiduciaries 
are entrusted with the power to weigh and prefer the interests of certain 
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constituencies to the interests of others (beyond their own self-interest). Given the 
current limitations of economic theory, progress in the analysis of the maximands 
of corporate governance may be achieved by drawing on additional sources of 
knowledge. (Licht, 2003: 6) 
 Institutional complementarities 
A further development of the path dependence thesis, is the emphasis on the 
interdependence of economic and social institutions: ‘Corporate governance 
consists not simply of elements but of systems… Transplanting some of the formal 
elements without regard for the institutional complements may lead to serious 
problems later, and these problems may impede, or reverse, convergence’ 
(Gordon and Roe, 2004: 6). Optimal corporate governance mechanisms are 
contextual and may vary by industries and activities. Identifying what constitutes 
good corporate governance practice is complex, and cannot be templated into a 
single form. One needs to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the system 
but also the underlying conditions which the system is dependant upon (Pinto, 
2005: 31; Maher and Andersson, 2000). The institutions that compose the 
system of corporate governance and complement each other consist not just of 
the law, finance, and ownership structure.  
Complementarities may extend to such things as labour relations and managerial 
incentive systems. In Germany and Japan, the corporations’ long term relations 
with banks, customers, and suppliers traditionally facilitates long term 
commitments to employees. The commitment to permanency promotes 
extensive firm-specific training, which contributes to flexible specialisation in the 
production of high quality goods. In contrast in the United States employer 
training investments are lower than in Japan and Germany, employees are more 
mobile, and there is less firm-specific skill development. Similarly, in the US 
fluid managerial labour markets make it easier for ousted managers to find new 
jobs after a hostile takeover. In contrast, in Japan management talent is carefully 
evaluated over a long period of time through career employment and managerial 
promotion systems. Jacoby contends ‘It is difficult to disentangle the exogenous 
initial conditions that established a path from the ex post adaptations…What’s 
most likely to be the case is that capital markets, labour markets, legal 
regulations, and corporate norms co-evolved from a set of initial conditions’ 
(2001: 17). He continues with a warning to those who might wish to randomly 
transplant particular institutional practices into other countries: 
Given institutional complementarities and path dependence, it’s difficult for one 
country to borrow a particular practice and expect it to perform similarly when 
transplanted to a different context…Were the Japanese or Germans to adopt a U.S.-
style corporate governance approach that relies on takeovers to mitigate agency 
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problems, it would prove highly disruptive of managerial incentive and selection 
systems presently in place. Hostile takeovers also would be disruptive of relations 
with suppliers and key customers, a substantial portion of which exist on a long 
term basis. In Germany and, especially, in Japan, there is less vertical integration 
of industrial companies than in the United States or the United Kingdom. Rather 
than rely primarily on arms-length contracts to protect suppliers and purchasers 
from opportunism, there is heavy use of relational contracting based on personal 
ties, trust, and reputation. Personal ties are supported by lifetime employment; the 
business relations are buttressed by cross-share holding. In short, imitation across 
path-dependent systems is inhibited by the cost of having to change a host of 
complementary practices that make an institution effective in a particular national 
system. (ibid.:18) 
Another way of understanding this Jacoby suggests is through the concept of 
multiple equilibria, which leads to the conclusion there is no best way of 
designing institutions to support stability and growth in advanced industrial 
countries:  
Multiple equilibria can arise and persist due to path dependence, institutional 
complementarities, bounded rationality, and comparative advantage. Sometimes 
multiple equilibria involve functionally similar but operationally distinctive 
institutions, such as the use of big firms as incubators in Japan versus the U.S. 
approach of incubation via start-ups and venture capital. Other times different 
institutions create qualitatively different outcomes. That is, a set of institutions, 
including those of corporate governance, may be better at facilitating certain kinds 
of business strategies and not others. Companies – and the countries in which 
they are embedded – can then secure international markets by specializing in 
those advantageous business strategies because foreign competitors will have 
difficulty imitating them. For example, the emphasis on specific human capital in 
German and Japan is supportive of production based technological learning, 
incremental innovation, and high quality production, all areas in which those 
economies have specialized. By contrast, the U.S. emphasis on resource mobility 
and on high short-term rewards directs resources to big-bang technological 
breakthroughs. In short, there are substantial gains to be reaped from sustaining 
institutional diversity and competing internationally on that basis. (ibid.: 25) 
The discussion of corporate governance is often framed in static efficiency terms, 
Jacoby contends, as if it was possible to measure the comparative performance of 
national governance institutions in a static framework. This is inadequate for 
understanding the dynamic properties of governance systems, especially 
concerning innovation and long-term growth.  
When there are multiple equilibria and bounded rationality regarding what 
constitutes an institutional optimum, we are operating in the world of the second 
best. In that world, there is no reason to believe that revamping a governance 
system will necessarily move an economy closer to an economic optimum. The 
economic case for the superiority of Anglo-American governance – and of the 
Anglo-American version of “free markets” as we know them, as opposed to a 
theoretical ideal – is actually rather weak. (ibid.: 27) 
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Integrated together the competing theories of convergence and diversity 
propounded in the disciplinary perspectives of history and politics, law and 
regulation, culture, and institutional complementarities offer a more nuanced 
prognosis of the future trends in corporate governance than crudely 
deterministic theories of governance convergence suggest. History and politics 
reminds us of the relation of distinctive institutional developments to the timing 
of industrialisation, the relative autonomy of states in regulating property and 
competition, and the significance of the structure and distribution of power and 
elites. Law and regulation impress upon us the significance of the distinctiveness 
of common and civil law approaches, and how these respond to maturing 
markets. Cultural approaches perceive the social foundations and distinctive 
values that inform different regimes of governance. Finally, the institutional 
complementarities approach identifies the interdependence of economic and 
social institutions that create complex systems of governance. These dynamic 
multiple equilibria of governance systems are unique, and whilst they might 
exhibit some degree of functional similarity, are based on profoundly distinctive 
experiences, values and objectives. 
Different governance systems are better at doing different things 
For Hansmann and Kraakman, convergence of corporate governance systems 
towards the shareholder-oriented model is not only desirable and inevitable, it 
has already happened. They boldly confirm:  
The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its 
principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as 
twenty-five years ago. Logic alone did not establish the superiority of this standard 
model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies, which establish a strong 
corporate management with duties to serve the interests of shareholders alone, as 
well as strong minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard model 
earned its position as the dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, 
by out-competing during the post-World War II period the three alternative 
models of corporate governance: the managerialist model, the labour-oriented 
model, and the state-oriented model. (2001: 16) 
For Hansmann and Kraakman, alternative systems are not viable competitively, 
only the lack of product market competition has kept them alive, and as global 
competitive pressures increase any continuing viability of alternative models will 
be eliminated, encouraging the ideological and political consensus in favour of 
the shareholder model. 
Hansmann and Kraakman dismiss the three rivals they set up for the victorious 
shareholder model. The managerialist model is associated with the US in the 
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1950s and 1960s, when it was thought professional managers could serve as 
disinterested technocratic fiduciaries who would guide the business corporation 
in the interests of the general public. According to Hansmann and Kraakman, 
this model of social benevolence collapsed into self-serving managerialism, with 
significant resource misallocation, imperilling the competitiveness of the model 
and accounting for its replacement by the shareholder driven model in the US 
(Gordon and Roe, 2004).  
The labour-oriented model exemplified by German co-determination, but 
manifest in many other countries, possesses governance structures amplifying 
the representation of labour, which Hansmann and Kraakman claim are 
inefficient because of the heterogeneity of interests among employees 
themselves, and between employees and shareholders. Firms with this inherent 
competition of interests would inevitably lose out in product market competition. 
Finally, the state-oriented model associated with France or Germany entails a 
large state role in corporate affairs through ownership or state bureaucratic 
engagement with firm managers, allowing elite guidance of private enterprise in 
the public interest. Hansmann and Kraakman argue this corporatist model has 
been discredited because of the poor performance of socialist economies (Gordon 
and Roe, 2004).  
At the height of the NASDAQ boom when Hansmann and Kraakman wrote their 
visionary article it might have appeared that the shareholder model in its US 
manifestation was certainly globally hegemonic in all of its manifestations. 
However, the post-global financial crisis world is less easily convinced of the 
inevitable and universal superiority of the US model of governance, and 
Hansmann and Kraakman may have written off the prospects of Japan and 
Europe a little too presumptuously, the best that could be salvaged from their 
over-confident thesis. The Anglo-American system might be better at doing some 
things which require the ready deployment of large amounts of liquid capital 
such as in high-tech innovation and global financial services. But the other 
governance systems have their own dynamism and valuable capabilities such as 
exhibited in German precision engineering, Japanese consumer electronics, 
French luxury goods, or Italian design. Essentially it seems that the different 
corporate governance systems may be better at doing different things, and with 
different outcomes for the economy and society. 
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Table 1. The continuing diversity of corporate governance systems. Sources: Adapted 
from Keenan and Aggestam (2001); Clarke and Bostock (1994). 
The continuing diversity in Anglo-American, Germanic, Latin and Japanese 
corporate governance systems is outlined in Table 1, indicating different 
orientations, concept of the firm, board structures, main stakeholders, the 
importance of stock and bond markets, the market for corporate control, 
ownership concentration, executive compensation, investment horizons, and the 
resulting corporate strengths and weaknesses that influence the types of products 
and services that are specialised in. The differences highlighted demonstrate that 
despite insistent pressures towards institutional and functional convergence, 
there remains a variety and distinctiveness in the regional approaches to 
corporate governance and strategy, which relates closely to their respective 
business strengths and weaknesses. There is a dynamism and vitality to this 
specialisation which continues to drive the distinctiveness and quality of the 
industries and products of these regions, despite the international financial, 
global value chain and functional pressures not only towards convergence but 
towards bland homogeneity in global industries, products and services. 
As Douglas Branson concludes regarding the globalisation and convergence 
debate, ‘seldom will one see scholarship and advocacy that is as culturally and 
economically insensitive, and condescending, as is the global convergence 
advocacy scholarship that the elites in United States academy have been throwing 
over the transom. Those elites have oversold an idea that has little grounding in 
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true global reality’ (2004: 276). Bebchuk and Roe’s (1999) view still holds that 
neither shareholder primacy nor dispersed ownership will easily converge. Path 
dependence has evolved established structures not easily transformed and 
complimentary institutions make it more difficult to do so. ‘Thus keeping 
existing systems may in fact be an efficient result. This lack of convergence 
allows for diversity and suggests that globalisation will not easily change the 
models’ (Pinto, 2005: 29). 
A more realistic global perspective than the convergence thesis is that there will 
continue to be considerable diversity both in the forms of corporate governance 
around the world. Different traditions, values and objectives will undoubtedly 
continue to produce different outcomes in governance, which will relate closely 
to the choices and preferences people exercise in engaging in business activity. If 
there is convergence of corporate governance, it could be to a variety of different 
forms, and it is likely there will be divergence away from the shareholder 
oriented Anglo-American model, as there will be convergence towards it. There 
is a growing realisation that shareholder value is a debilitating ideology which is 
undermining corporations with an over-simplification of complex business 
reality, weakening managers, corporations and economies, and ignoring the 
diversity of investment institutions and interests (Clarke, 2014; Lazonick, 2014). 
Certainly boards of directors in the US and UK in recent years have felt a more 
immediate responsibility to recognise a wider range of relevant constituencies as 
stakeholder perspectives arguably have once again become a more prominent 
part of corporate life (David et al., 2007; Deakin and Whittaker, 2007; Clarke, 
2010b; Klettner et al., 2014; Clarke, 2015; Clarke, 2016b). In US firms 
recognition of the growing importance of intellectual capital, and the adoption of 
high performance work practices, have all reemphasised the importance of 
human capital in a context where previously labour was marginalised in the 
interests of a single minded shareholder ethos (Jacoby, 2001: 26). It is ironic that 
as European and Japanese listed corporations are being forced to recognise the 
importance of shareholder value; Anglo-American corporations are being sharply 
reminded of their social responsibilities.  
The widespread adoption among leading Anglo-American corporations of 
publishing social and environmental reports alongside their financial reports, 
and actively demonstrating their corporate social responsibility in other more 
practical ways, suggests this may be more than simply a rhetorical change 
(Searcy, 2012; Schembera, 2012). The formal adoption of enlightened shareholder 
value in the UK Companies Act indicates at least a rhetorical move forwards 
from the more naked pursuit of shareholder value (Keay, 2013). Further unlikely 
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evidence that the United States system could in some important ways be 
converging towards the European model is unearthed by Thomsen (2001).  
The pattern of insider ownership and extensive block holding in the US, does not 
demarcate the American system as sharply from the European as is often 
suggested. And the trend may be in this direction as apparently the stock market 
in Anglo-American systems responds positively to higher ownership by financial 
institutions, and one reason for this may be the perception of better monitoring 
(Thomsen, 2001: 310). The increasing importance of institutional investors in the 
US, and in every other market, means that ownership relations are once again 
becoming more concentrated (even if the ultimate beneficiaries are highly 
diffuse). This institutional ownership has begun to create forms of relational 
investing, which could over time lead to more exercise of voice and less of exit by 
US shareholders (Jacoby, 2001: 26).  
Much attention has been focussed upon the pressures driving large listed 
German corporations to focus more directly on the creation of shareholder value, 
and upon the insistent pressures for Japanese corporations to demonstrate more 
transparency and disclosure (Clarke and Chanlat, 2009; Jackson and Sorge, 
2012; Amable et al., 2012; Seki and Clarke, 2014). Less attention has been paid to 
the developing pressures upon Anglo-American corporations to exercise greater 
accountability towards institutional investors and more responsibility in relation 
to their stakeholder communities (Williams and Zumbansen, 2011; Deeg, 2012). 
With multiple institutions exerting interdependent effects on firm level 
outcomes (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003: 448), and with different values informing 
the objectives for the enterprise in different cultures (Hofstede, 2004), the 
scenario for convergence and diversity of corporate governance models is more 
complex and unpredictable than many commentators have suggested. A pioneer 
of corporate governance possessed a more compelling grasp of the possibilities 
that convergence and divergence may occur simultaneously: that is an insistent 
increase in diversity within an overall trend towards convergence: 
Looking ahead towards the next decade it is possible to foresee a duality in the 
developing scenarios. On the one hand, we might expect further diversity – new 
patterns of ownership, new forms of group structure, new types of strategic 
alliance, leading to yet more alternative approaches to corporate governance. More 
flexible and adaptive organisational arrangements, entities created for specific 
projects, business ventures and task forces are likely to compound the diversity. 
Sharper differentiation of the various corporate governance types and the different 
bases for governance power will be necessary to increase the effectiveness of 
governance and enable the regulatory processes to respond to reality… But on the 
other hand, we might expect a convergence of governance processes as large 
corporations operating globally, their shares traded through global financial 
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markets, are faced with increasing regulatory convergence in company law, 
disclosure requirements and international accounting standards, insider trading 
and securities trading rules, and the exchange of information between the major 
regulatory bodies around the world. (Tricker, 1994: 520) 
In this analysis the strength of diversity rather than uniformity becomes 
apparent, even to the extent there is some convergence of regulation, and it is 
increasingly likely this will need to be negotiated among regions and countries 
rather than disseminated from the Anglo-American heartland. ‘There is then 
value in maintaining international diversity in corporate governance systems, so 
that we do not foreclose future alternatives and evolutionary possibilities. The 
argument resembles the argument for biodiversity in species’ (McDonnell, 2002: 
18). The importance of diversity for the exercise of choice and creativity is 
paramount, and reveals the dangers involved in national and international 
policymaking vigorously advocating a one-size-fits-all prescription for corporate 
governance (McDonnell, 2002: 19). Indeed, this essential dynamism of corporate 
governance was fully recognised in the OECD Business Advisory Group’s report 
at the time of the formulation of the original OECD principles: 
 Entrepreneurs, investors and corporations need the flexibility to craft governance 
arrangements that are responsive to unique business contexts so that corporations 
can respond to incessant changes in technologies, competition, optimal firm 
organization and vertical networking patterns. A market for governance 
arrangements should be permitted so that these arrangements that can attract 
investors and other resource contributors – and support competitive corporations 
– flourish. To obtain governance diversity, economic regulations, stock exchange 
rules and corporate law should support a range of ownership and governance 
forms. Over time, availability of ‘off the shelf’ solutions will offer benefits of 
market familiarity and learning, judicial enforceability and predictability. (OECD, 
1998: 34) 
Future trends 
Contemplating the future of corporate governance systems is a hazardous 
business. Each of the systems is facing pressures to change. The long-term 
stakeholder orientation of the German and Japanese governance systems is 
under insistent pressure to deliver shareholder value, particularly from overseas 
investment institutions. However, the market oriented short-termism of the 
Anglo-American approach is itself being challenged by international, national 
and community agencies to recognize wider social and environmental 
responsibilities. The German and Japanese systems are faced with demands for 
increased transparency and disclosure from both regulators and investors, while 
Anglo-American corporations are faced with repeated calls for greater 
accountability from institutional investors and other stakeholder communities.  
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Bratton and McCahery (2002: 30) recognized four possible outcomes from the 
present pressures to converge, and the resilient institutional resistance 
encountered: 
i. a unitary system as there is strong convergence towards a global system 
which assembles the best elements of both major governance systems 
and combines them together (the least likely alternative); 
ii. a universal market based system as anticipated by the Chicago School of 
financial economists, representing the triumph of the rules based 
outsider system; 
iii. an improved variety of governance systems in which there is weak 
convergence, but some learning from each other between the different 
national systems; 
iv. a set of viable distinctive governance systems, based on distinctive 
institutional complementarity each having a unique identity and 
capability. 
Contrary to all of the predictions of an early and complete convergence of 
corporate governance systems, the final two alternatives are the closest to the 
present state of play, and are likely to be for some time to come, as this 
differentiated system has a proven robustness and usefulness, reflecting different 
industrial strengths and strategic directions. The immense capacity of the 
international finance institutions to continue to drive economic and social 
change in their own interests should be recognised, and the increasing 
financialisation of corporations globally disciplined to narrower and narrower 
financial objectives is a plausible scenario. The continuing threat to the variety 
and distinctiveness of regional forms of corporate governance and strategy 
should be recognised. However Anglo-American financial institutions, even if 
untamed by post-crisis regulation, are under some constraint by the widespread 
popular demand that they demonstrate greater social responsibility (Clarke, 
2010b; Clarke, 2016a). Secondly as presently in China, regional financial systems 
with different orientations and objectives to the Western banks may exert 
increasing influence (and indeed Chinese corporations have benefited from this 
radically different regime in their rapid advance). 
Complexity of Corporate Governance Forms 
It is likely the campaign to raise standards of corporate governance will continue 
for some time in all jurisdictions of the world. There will be a strenuous effort to 
secure commitment to the essential basis of trust identified by the OECD as 
fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility. However, this will occur 
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in countries with different cultures, legal systems, and economic priorities and 
social commitments. This campaign to raise standards of accountability in 
corporate governance should be distinguished from the intense and numbing 
assault by international financial interests to impose on the corporations of the 
world a narrow and self-interested shareholder value ideology which will serve to 
constrain corporations’ purpose and development.  
To assume that all countries will adapt to the same corporate governance 
structures is unrealistic, unfounded and unimaginative. It is likely that 
fundamental features of the European and Asian approaches to corporate 
governance will be maintained, even where the apparatus of market-based 
corporate governance are formally adopted. Often these differences will be 
perceived as part of the cultural integrity and economic dynamism of the 
economy in question. To the extent countries adopt universal principles they will 
do so within a culturally diverse set of corporate values, structures, objectives and 
practices. This is part of the evolving and dynamic complexity of corporate life, in 
which both convergence and divergence can occur simultaneously. As pressures 
to conform to international standards and expectations increase, the resilience of 
historical and cultural differences will continue. The business case for diversity 
is, if anything, even more compelling. There will be a continual need to innovate 
around new technologies, processes and markets. This will stimulate new 
organisational and corporate forms, the shape and objectives of which will be 
hard to predetermine. 
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